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This paper attempts to evaluate the Pareto optimality of SAFTA for all the member states. 
Besides, the welfare optimality of three other alternative sets of coordinated trade policies 
that go beyond SAFTA has also been studied here. These include (a) extended preferential 
trading between SAFTA and three other major trading blocs (ASEAN, NAFTA and EU27), 
(b) coordinated full trade liberalisation (carried out unilaterally or as part of a multilateral 
agreement) by South Asian countries, and (c) SAFTA plus a customs union (two variants with 
5% and 10% CET). The analysis, using the standard static GTAP model, shows that the 
welfare basis for establishing SAFTA or for deeper trade policy coordination is not very 
strong. Nor is it obvious that cooperation among the South Asia would be forthcoming given 
the anticipated welfare impacts. 
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1 Introduction 
During last decade, the stalemate in multilateral trade negotiations under the framework 
of World Trade Organization (WTO) regime has provided impetus to the signing of regional 
trade agreements world over and South Asia is not an exception to this trend. In South Asia, 
the regional integration process started-off when seven South Asian countries—Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—initiated a framework for 
region-wide integration under the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) in 
1995. However, problems such as limited coverage of commodities, political disagreements, 
bilateral issues, and non-cooperation among members made SAPTA ineffective. The South 
Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) signed in early 2004, which came into force on 1
st July 
2006, is expected to overcome these problems. The SAFTA is a parallel initiative to the 
multilateral trade liberalization commitments of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) member countries. SAFTA aims to reduce tariffs for intraregional 
trade among the seven SAARC member countries. It has been agreed that for the South Asian 
countries, Pakistan and India will eliminate all tariffs by 2012, Sri Lanka by 2013 and 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal by 2015.  
In addition to SAFTA, some countries in the region are members of other regional / 
bilateral trade agreements. Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka are members of two other 
regional groups, viz., the Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic 
Cooperation (BIMST-EC) group, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association of Regional 
Cooperation (IOR-ARC), which was formed in 1997. The latter is a larger-scale regional 
initiative, and includes many members of the Indian Ocean Rim, including South Africa and 
Australia. Besides, India and Sri Lanka are parties to a bilateral free trade agreement, viz., the 
Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ILFTA) that came into effect from 1 March 2000.  
There have been some strong arguments for the regional economic integration in South 
Asia, as this integration is thought to generate significant intraregional trade and welfare 
gains for the South Asian countries. However, critics have pointed out that the potential 
benefits from the SAFTA and other regional trading arrangements in South Asia are little 
because there are limited complementarities in the region; major trading partners of the 
individual South Asian countries are located in the west etc. It is also alleged that an RTA in 
South Asia will lead to substantial trade diversion than trade creation and it may work as a 
stumbling bloc to multilateral trade liberalization. Given these aforementioned arguments and   4
counter-arguments it is therefore imperative to examine the impacts of the SAFTA and 
cooperation among the South Asian countries for greater trade policy coordination. 
Literature available on the theory of RTAs mainly deals with two important questions: 
what are the impacts of RTAs on member countries? And what are their impacts on the world 
trading system as a whole? However, many researchers find these theoretical models 
ambiguous in determining whether RTAs are net trade-creating or net trade-diverting; and 
whether they are “building blocs” or “stumbling blocs” to multilateral trade liberalisation. 
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) and Panagariya (1996, 1998) argued that RTAs are likely to 
reduce welfare in member countries and impede multilateral trade liberalisation (Robinson 
and Thierfelder 1999). Others have argued that, “it is essentially an empirical issue that must 
be settled by analysis of data” (Lewis et al. 2001). Such views have led to the increasing 
importance of quantitative evaluations of RTAs to provide insight into the effects of RTAs. 
The effects of South Asian economic integration have not been investigated as 
extensively as similar agreements in other regions. While there are many qualitative studies 
on SAARC and SAPTA (e.g. Panchamukhi et al 1990; Kelegama 1996, 1999; Khan 1999), 
quantitative studies are rare. Against this background, this paper attempts to provide a 
quantitative assessment of the likely impact of the SAFTA on the South Asian countries. We 
use the multi-country Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model developed by the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) to examine the effects of SAFTA. Besides, we also 
examine the impacts of alternative trade liberalization scenarios involving the South Asian 
countries. These include extended regional trading arrangements involving the South Asian 
countries and other countries / regions such as the ASEAN, the EU, the USA; unilateral and 
multilateral full trade liberalization scenarios; and finally, a South Asian customs union with 
alternative rates of common external tariffs.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section, presents some stylized 
facts about SAFTA. Section 3 reviews the literature on the potentials of SAFTA, its impact 
on intra-regional trade, and the alternative trade policy options available to the countries of 
the region for promoting greater regional co-operation. The experimental design with GTAP 
model and methodology of this study is introduced in Section 4. Simulation results of 
different policy scenarios are presented in section 5; and the concluding remarks and 
limitations of the study are discussed in the final section.  
2  Regional Integration in South Asia – Some Stylized Facts 
South Asia has been involved in setting up its own RTA. The South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was formed in 1985 with the objective of exploiting 
“accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region” for 
the welfare of the peoples of South Asia (SAARC Secretariat, 2006a). In 1995, the South 
Asian Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA) came into force.    5
SAPTA advanced the region’s commitment to deeper integration with limited success. 
The implementation of the agreement was characterized by sequential rounds of negotiations 
in which trade preferences were granted on a product-by-product basis. Its rules of origin, 
however, were too restrictive for most of its members and these were subsequently relaxed 
somewhat in 1999, and trade facilitation measures were implemented on a limited scale. Only 
the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) within the region obtained significant trade 
preferences while most of the trade among the larger countries of the region was still subject 
to considerable trade barriers (Baysan et al., 2006 and SAARC Secretariat, 2006b).  
At the Ninth SAARC Summit held in Male in May, 1997, the Heads of State or 
Government recognised the importance of achieving a free trade area by the year 2001 and 
reiterated that steps towards trade liberalisation must take into account the special needs of 
the smaller and the least developed countries and benefits of trade liberalisation must accrue 
equitably. This mandate was reiterated at the Tenth SAARC Summit held at Colombo in July, 
1998. Towards this end, they decided that a Committee of Experts (CoE), in consultation 
with Member States, be constituted with specific Terms of Reference (TOR) to work on 
drafting a comprehensive treaty regime for creating a free trade area.  
Recognising the need to move quickly towards a South Asian Free Trade Area, the Heads 
of State or Government directed the Council of Ministers to finalise the text of the Draft 
Treaty Framework by the end of 2002 at the Eleventh SAARC Summit held at Kathmandu, 
Nepal in January, 2002. They also directed that in moving towards the goal of SAFTA, the 
Member States expedite action to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers and structural 
impediments to free trade. The CoE held several meetings during 2002 and 2003 in 
Kathmandu to finalise the text of the agreement. Some of the contentious issues were finally 
resolved in the Council of Ministers (Foreign Ministers) Meeting on 2-3 January, 2004 and 
the agreement was signed during the Twelfth SAARC Summit held in Islamabad on 4-6 
January, 2004. Subsequently, the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) has been 
ratified and entered into force in mid-2006.  
SAFTA builds on the provisions of SAPTA. SAFTA extends the scope of SAPTA to 
include trade facilitation elements and switches the tariff liberalization process from a 
positive to a negative list approach. A special consideration in SAFTA is the compensation 
for revenue losses for small countries in the event of tariff reductions (Baunsgaard and Keen, 
2005). For these countries SAFTA proposes that “until alternative domestic arrangements are 
formulated to address this situation, the Contracting States agree to establish an appropriate 
mechanism to compensate the Least Developed Contracting States…” (SAARC Secretariat, 
2006c). 
The SAFTA accord, signed in January, 2004, now proposes not only to turn the SAPTA 
into an FTA but goes beyond it by including in the core agreement provisions for trade 
facilitation, harmonization of customs classification, removal of restrictions on intra-regional 
investment, macroeconomic consultations, and development of communication systems and   6
transportation infrastructure. Under the trade liberalization component, the member countries 
agree to gradually harmonize and eventually bring down their import tariffs on trade within 
SAFTA to 5 percent or less. Accordingly, in the first phase, the LDC members in SAFTA 
will reduce their maximum tariff rates to 30 percent within two years from the date of coming 
into force of the Agreement (i.e., by January 1, 2008). The non-LDC members will reduce 
their maximum rates to 20 percent within the same time frame. In the second phase, which 
will resume on January 1, 2008, the non-LDC members will reduce their import tariffs to 5 
percent or less in 5 years (i.e., by January 1, 2013), while the LDCs will do the same in 8 
years (i.e., by January 1, 2016). The agreement allows the exclusion of “sensitive” items 
through member-specific negative lists, which are to be negotiated by the member countries.  
However, the level of regional integration in South Asia – especially among its largest 
members – remains low, and trade barriers continue to be relatively high for any region in the 
world. The proportion of trade originating in the region has increased in the last decade but 
still lags behind ASEAN levels. While Bangladesh, India and Pakistan sustain 5 percent of 
their exports and 2½ percent of their imports with regional partners, the smallest members 
(Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, and Sri Lanka) exhibit a higher reliance on local trade relations 
averaging 20 percent and 9 percent for imports and exports, respectively.
2 In terms of trade 
barriers the region has undertaken an overall liberalization program with India reducing its 
average tariff level by around 20 percentage points during the last 8 years. However, there is 
significant room for further liberalization given that all seven countries still impose higher 
tariff barriers than ASEAN and ASEAN Plus3.  
3  Literature on Regional Integration in South Asia 
In this section, we review the studies on regional integration in South Asia specifically 
with regard to the potential of SAFTA delivering benefits to the member countries, and the 
options for co-operation amongst them towards coordinated trade policies, and the likely 
impact on intra-regional trade.  
3.1  Potential of SAFTA  
In the literature on RTA political harmony, complementarities, and differences in 
competitiveness are often mentioned as pre-conditions for a RTA to be successful. Analysts 
believe that the political tension between the two large countries in the region, India and 
Pakistan, is a main constraint to the regional integration. The nuclear tests conducted by India 
and Pakistan, the Kargil war and the political change in Pakistan are major obstacles for 
regional cooperation. SAARC failed to hold a previously scheduled summit in November 
1999 because relations between India and Pakistan worsened in the wake of their "tit-for-tat" 
nuclear tests and the military takeover in Pakistan. Pakistan has also not given its word on the 
                                                 
2  Due to limited availability of trade statistics for smaller members, the variability should be interpreted with caution. The 
last observation year for these four members (exports and imports) is 1999.   7
opening of land routes at Wagah and Karachi for trade with India. Pakistan allows import of 
only onions, potatoes, garlic, animals, halal meat, vaccines, medicines for cancer and AIDS, 
and sugar through land route and rest of the items are to be routed through third countries 
such as UAE, which complicates procedures and increases freight costs. Similarly, the 
internal conflict in Sri Lanka and the illegal trade along the Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Nepal 
borders are frequent cause for political discord amongst the countries of the region. Unless 
SAARC countries are able to develop cordial political relations it would be very hard to 
achieve the real gains from SAFTA.  
Among the economic factors, trade complementarity and differences in competitiveness 
of the countries are usually mentioned as important for the success of RTAs. Empirical 
literature suggests that the existence of complementarity is needed to enhance the probability 
of a regional trade arrangement to be net trade-creating, rather than net trade-diverting. The 
statistical measures such as the complementarity index argue that the higher the observed 
values of the index between partners, the more likely is it that a proposed regional trade 
agreement will succeed (Michaely, 1996). Indices of trade complementarity developed by 
Drysdale (1969) can be used to check the existence of trade complementarity in South Asia. 
Kemal et al. (2000) have estimated the complementarity indices for all five leading South 
Asian countries using time series trade data and found that there is a lack of strong trade 
complementarity in the bilateral trade structures of South Asia. Lack of trade 
complementarities raises the questions on the future prospects of SAFTA.  
Countries with different comparative advantage profiles, in principle, have more 
opportunities to trade with each other compared with those with similar comparative 
advantage profiles. The prospects of increasing regional trade depends more on the existence 
of product complementarities and export efficiencies (defined by comparative advantage) and 
other characteristics such as the degree of concentration and diversification of trade profiles 
amongst the regional partners. The main problem related to South Asian economic 
integration is that countries in the region are producing and trading similar commodities. To 
identify different country’s competitiveness among different commodity groups, the Export 
Revealed Comparative Advantage indices (XRCA) have been estimated by two recent studies 
for commodities at the three-digit level using recent UN trade data (Samaratunga 1999 and 
Kemal et al. 2000). These indices show the comparative advantage in terms of the share of a 
particular industry in a country’s total exports relative to the industry’s share in total world 
exports. The results of these two studies indicate that countries in South Asia have an almost 
identical pattern of comparative advantage in a relatively narrow band of commodities and 
these countries do not have comparative advantages in a wide range of capital goods and 
advanced manufactured products. The lack of trade complementarity in bilateral trade flow 
and the similarity of the pattern of comparative advantage in the region have been the main 
constraints for the growth of intraregional trade (Kemal et al. 2000). In a recent study Pitigala 
(2005) summarized that the region has shown a mutual dependency in basic foods and 
agricultural products, although they are not fully liberalized. A narrow group of products   8
which are mostly made up of agriculture and raw material for manufacture, on which most 
countries display comparative advantage has created inroads in regional trade. Countries have 
to develop comparative advantages in the different commodities especially in the products 
which they are trading with non-members to make the SAFTA successful in its true sense. 
Given the political friction, limited complementarities, broad similarities in comparative 
advantage of the South Asian countries, it is pertinent to ask what if any would be the 
potential benefits of SAFTA to the member countries? Would all the member countries gain? 
If not, then what could be the other choices? In what follows we review the studies that 
examined the impacts of SAFTA on intra-regional trade in South Asia, and the trade policy 
alternatives that have been suggested for these countries.  
3.2  Impact on Intra-Regional Trade 
Some studies predict the potential impact of tariff elimination on intra-regional trade. Few 
are reviewed here. Srinivasan and Canonero (1995) employ the gravity model and predict that 
the impact of a South Asian FTA on trade flows will be small for India but much larger on 
the smaller countries. Their simulation shows that the effect of removing all tariffs would be 
to increase total trade between 3 percent of GDP for India and 59 percent of GDP for Nepal 
and in between for other countries. Sengupta and Banik (1997) predict a 30 percent increase 
in the official intra-SAARC trade and as much as 60 percent if illegal trade, which is 
currently out of the official count, becomes a part of official trade. These results are intuitive; 
India being large, the impact on its trade of the FTA with the small neighbours cannot be 
proportionately large. Rajapakse and Arunatilake (1997) have also used the gravity approach 
to investigate the implications of SAPTA for Sri Lanka and have found that Sri Lanka would 
gain from SAPTA. To evaluate the magnitude of preferential trade under SAPTA, Mukherji 
(2000) has estimated the extent of trade preference under all SAPTA rounds in terms of trade 
values and the percentages of preferential imports to total values of imports related to all 
member countries. Mukherji’s estimates show that the region’s total preferential imports 
amounted to about US$479.8 million, nearly half of which went to Pakistan. India’s share of 
preferential trade out of total regional preferential imports was about 26 per cent while that 
for Sri Lanka was about 16 per cent. He also estimated percentages of each member country’s 
total preferential imports in terms of its total regional imports. Pakistan has the highest 
coverage of preferential imports (about 40 per cent), followed by Nepal (35 per cent), India 
(30 per cent), Bhutan (17 per cent) and Sri Lanka (12 per cent). RIS (2004) reports the result 
of studies conducted in the framework of gravity model. It suggests that complete elimination 
of tariffs under SAFTA may increase the intra-regional trade by 1.6 times. It further suggests 
that in the dynamic framework the gains from liberalisation are at least 25 per cent higher 
than the static gains.    9
3.3  Free Trade Agreement and/or Custom Union in South Asia  
Some studies attempted to quantify the gains from custom union scenario in South Asia. 
Jayaraman (1978) looked at the static effects of a hypothetical customs union in South Asia, 
with the post-union common external tariff equal to the lowest pre-union tariff rate. The 
study shows that gains are however of a small magnitude only. Similarly, Rahman, et al. 
(1981) studied the static welfare effects of a South Asian customs union with the common 
external tariff equal to the weighted average rates of all country averages. They show that the 
expected welfare gain for the region as a whole is likely to be quite modest, not exceeding 
0.07 percent of the region’s total regional product. Siriwardana (2002) uses the GTAP model 
version 5 database, which contains data for Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and the rest of the 
world, to explore two plausible scenarios for free trade in South Asia; first, the effects of 
elimination of all tariffs between South Asian countries under a FTA; second, the effects of a 
10 per cent Common External Tariff (CET) targeting non-members of the proposed South 
Asian FTA. The results suggest that trade liberalisation is beneficial to South Asian countries 
in terms of GDP and welfare gains under both policy scenarios. However, the extent of the 
benefits varies between countries. In the event that an FTA is established for South Asia, the 
effects of trade creation are likely to outweigh the effects of trade diversion, leading to net 
expansion of trade in the entire region. 
3.4  Extending SAFTA to Other Regional Blocs 
Few researchers used GTAP database for computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
modelling to assess the likely gains from different integration options in the region. In theses 
studies attempts have been made to assess possible gains from different alternative policy 
scenarios particularly the extension of SAFTA to other blocs such as NAFTA, EU, ASEAN, 
APEC etc. and comparing these scenarios with either multilateral and/or unilateral choice. 
Pigato et al. (1997) employs used the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) version 3 and 
examined the effects of a South Asian RTA under the following two policy scenarios; first 
the effects of preferential trade liberalisation in the region; second the effects of unilateral 
trade liberalisation. The results show that SAPTA generates significant benefits for India and 
the rest of South Asia (0.5 per cent of GDP or a 1.3 billion US 1992 dollar increase for India; 
and 1 per cent of GDP or 0.7 billion US 1992 dollar increase for the rest of South Asia). 
India’s gains were much higher in the unilateral trade liberalisation scenarios (4.1 per cent or 
10.9 billion US 1992 dollar of GDP compared to 0.8 per cent of GDP or 0.6 billion US 1992 
dollar). Siriwardana (2001) using version 4 GTAP database focuses on bilateral trade 
liberalisation between Sri Lanka and SAARC countries and the implications for Sri Lanka. It 
conducted 12 trade liberalisation related experiments between SAARC countries, ASEAN 
countries and other Asian countries. The results of this study suggest that Sri Lanka would 
benefit from bilateral trade liberalisation between Sri Lanka and SAARC countries. Sri Lanka 
would benefit further by expanding bilateral trade liberalisation into ASEAN and other Asian 
countries. However, the results were mixed in terms of detailed commodity-wise analysis.   10
De Rosa and Govindan (1995, 1996) evaluate three possible policy options for South Asia 
First, the implications of SAPTA by looking at the effects of removal of tariffs and Para-
tariffs on intra-regional imports; second, The implications of closer economic ties between 
SAARC and APEC countries by looking at removal of trade barriers between the two 
regions; and third, the implications of unilateral trade liberalization in South Asia. The results 
support SAPTA in terms of an increase in food trade. However, this study suggests that 
SAARC countries might achieve much larger gains in trade and welfare by intensifying 
efforts to integrate the South Asian economies with the world economy. This study found that 
the net trade creation of SAPTA was limited due to extensive trade diversification. 
Samaratunga (1999) investigated the effects of SAARC-APEC trade links and found that the 
potential for export expansion of the SAARC region into APEC countries is limited within 
the 1991–1995 policy framework. 
Bandara and Yu (2003) applied the CGE model with version 5 of GTAP database and 
conducted a series of policy simulations to answer the question of how desirable a South 
Asian Free Trade Area is? These policy simulations are related to unilateral trade 
liberalisation by South Asia; preferential trade liberalisation in South Asia; preferential trade 
liberalisation between South Asia and ASEAN, NAFTA, EU; and multi-trade liberalisation. 
The results suggest that the impact of preferential trade liberalisation is very small, but that 
the impact of unilateral trade liberalisation is significant for South Asian countries. Under 
preferential trade liberalisation, small countries would lose or gain marginally. Daniel (2007) 
evaluates the SAFTA within the global structure of overlapping RTAs using modified gravity 
equation. First, it examines the effects of the Trade Liberalization Program (TLP) which 
started in 2006. SAFTA would have a minor effect on regional trade flows and the impact on 
custom duties would be a manageable fiscal shock for most members. Second, the paper 
ranks the trade effects of other potential RTAs for individual South Asian countries and 
SAFTA: RTAs with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European 
Union (EU) dominate one with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Baysan, et al. (2006) conclude that, considered in isolation, the economic case for 
SAFTA is quite weak. When compared with the rest of the world, the region is tiny both in 
terms of economic size as measured by GDP (and per capita incomes) and the share in the 
world trade. It is argued that prima facie, these facts make it likely that trade diversion would 
be dominant as a result of SAFTA. This point is reinforced by the presence of high levels of 
protection in the region and the tendency of the member countries to establish highly 
restrictive ‘sectoral exceptions/sensitive lists’ and stringent ‘rules of origin’. They further 
argue that SAFTA makes sense only in the context of a much broader strategy of creating a 
larger preferential trade area in the region that specifically would encompass China and the 
member nations of the Association of South East Asian Nations. In turn, the case for the latter 
is strategic; the pursuit of regionalism in the Americas and Europe has created increasing 
discrimination against Asian exports to those regions, which must inevitably impact the 
region’s terms of trade adversely. An Asian bloc could be a potential instrument of changing   11
incentives for the trade blocs in the Americas and Europe and forcing multilateral freeing of 
trade. Assuming that the SAFTA here to stay, the study further suggests steps to ensure that 
the agreement can be made more effective in promoting intra-regional trade, while 
minimizing the likely trade diversion costs and maximizing the potential benefits. 
Raihan and Razzaque (2007) examined the features and prospects of different regional 
integration and bilateral FTAs in South Asia involving Bangladesh. The paper has also 
estimated the trade creation and trade diversion aspects of the total welfare effects of SAFTA 
scenarios. Results suggest that a full implementation of SAFTA will lead to welfare gains for 
India, Sri Lanka and rest of South Asian countries, though Bangladesh suffers from welfare 
loss. Bangladesh’s welfare loss is mainly driven by the negative trade diversion effect. 
Simulation results also suggest that the negative trade diversion effect can be undermined by 
some associated unilateral trade liberalisation measure.  
4  Methodology and Experimental Design with GTAP  
The analytical framework used to quantify the impact of bilateral tariff reductions is the 
well known GTAP model (Hertel, 1996). It is a comparative-static multi-regional CGE model 
that is being used by many researchers around the world. Global CGE models are more useful 
than econometric models and partial equilibrium models in analysing issues related to PTAs. 
Firstly, these models incorporate the necessary links between different agents in each country 
/ region. Secondly, these models are based on the input-output structure of each country, 
which links industries together. Thirdly, all individual countries are linked through 
international trade flows to form a general equilibrium model in which prices and quantities 
supplied and demanded are determined simultaneously in all primary factor markets and 
domestic and international commodity markets. Finally, a global CGE model structure 
reflects the fact that all parts of the world economy hinge together in a network of direct and 
indirect linkages. This means that any changes in any part of the system will in principle 
affect the entire world. Quantitative assessments have provided valuable inputs into policy 
debates on PTAs. These CGE modelling applications have been surveyed by Flam (1992), 
Baldwin and Venables (1995), Francois and Shields (1994), De Rosa (1998), Bandara (1998) 
and Robinson and Thierfelder (1999). Despite the criticism levelled at CGE evaluations of 
PTAs (see Panagariya (2000); Panagariya and Dattagupta 2001), Baldwin and Venables 
(1995), De Rosa (1998) and Robinson and Thierfelder (1999) have clearly recognised the 
contributions made by CGE models in evaluating PTAs.  
However, GTAP has rarely been used to address issues of South Asia (with few 
exceptions such as Pigato et al., 1997). One of the main reasons for this is the inadequate 
treatment of the member countries of SAARC in earlier versions of the GTAP database. 
South Asia (except India) was only an aggregated region in the earlier versions of GTAP 
database until 1998. Subsequently, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have been incorporated as 
separate countries in the GTAP database versions 5 and 6. Thus, Bangladesh, India, Sri   12
Lanka and the Rest of South Asia (RSA) are the four separate country / regions in the GTAP 
database, which provides us an opportunity to use the GTAP model in a sensible way to 
illustrate the quantification of the effects of regional integration in South Asia. In order to 
perform policy simulations, we aggregate the GTAP version 6 database
3 into 15 regions, 
keeping Bangladesh (BGD), India (IND), Sri Lanka (LKA), and the Rest of South Asia 
(RSA) as separate regions (see the Appendix A1) and 11 sectors (see the Appendix A2). 
While we carry out the simulations at this level of regional and sectoral aggregation, for ease 
of interpretation we report the results at the level of five sectors: Agriculture (AGRI) 
(aggregate of cereals, other crops, animal products incl. fishing); mining and manufacturing 
(M&M) (natural resources, petroleum & coal products, other manufactures); services (SRVS) 
(construction, margin services, other services. Besides, agro-processing (AGPR) and textiles 
(TXTL) are reported as such. On the region side, the results have been reported primarily for 
the four South Asian countries in the GTAP model / database  
The relative size South Asian economies in world GDP and trade are reported in Table 1. 
In 2001, the region as a whole accounted for just 2% of world GDP, and about 1.3% of world 
imports and world exports. As the largest nation in the region, India accounts over three-
fourth of the GDP of the region, and about two-thirds of the region’s trade. The relative 
insignificance of the region as a whole in world trade is largely due to the historically 
autarchic policies followed by the countries of the region, especially by India, that accorded a 
very low importance to international trade. Although all the countries of this region have 
embarked upon trade liberalization effort especially during the 1980s and 1990s, dependence 
on international trade is still not very high for most of these countries (except Sri Lanka) as 
reflected in the low ratios of exports and imports to GDP.  
 
Table 1: South Asia in the World 
  Share in the World  Trade Dependence Ratio 
  GDP %  Exports % Import % Export/GDP  Import/GDP
Bangladesh 0.15  0.11  0.14  0.17  0.22 
India 1.53  0.89  0.87  0.13  0.13 
Sri Lanka  0.05  0.09  0.09  0.41  0.42 
Rest of South Asia  0.27  0.21  0.21  0.17  0.18 
Source:  GTAP database version 6 
 
A possible reason for the relatively low dependence of these economies on international 
trade is the high import tariffs that remain in South Asia even after the attempts at 
liberalization. Appendix Tables 3 to 6, report the bilateral import tariff rates in the year 2001 
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of the four South Asian countries. India retains high tariffs on agriculture, textile, 
manufacturing sector with the tariff rates ranging between 12 to 95 per cent. India has 
relatively higher tariffs than any other South Asian country. Though Bangladesh, Sri Lanka 
and Rest of South Asia are less protective compared to India, their tariff rates in some sectors 
are on a par with India. In all the South Asian countries the highest tariff rates are in general 
applied on imports from non-South Asian trading partners.  
Turning to the trade patterns, all the South Asian countries trade more with non-South 
Asian countries than amongst themselves (Table 2). In general China, Japan, REA, ASEAN, 
NAFTA, EU27, and MENA are the major trading partners for most of the South Asian 
countries. Two features stand out of the little intra-regional trade that takes place in South 
Asia. First, the intra-regional trade for Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Rest of South Asia is 
primarily India centric, with very little trade taking place amongst each other. Second, while 
India is an important source of imports and market for exports to these three countries, none 
of them is a major trade partner for India.  
 
Table 2: South Asian Countries Trade Share 
  Import Share from World    Export Share to World 
Import 
source 
BGD IND  LKA  RSA Export 
destination 
BGD IND LKA RSA 
1  ANZ  0.028 0.027 0.04  0.026 1  ANZ  0.005 0.012  0.012  0.013 
2  CHN  0.121  0.044  0.061 0.062  2  CHN  0.002 0.034 0.007 0.042 
3  JPN  0.062 0.042 0.05  0.055 3  JPN  0.019 0.048  0.048  0.035 
4  REA  0.148 0.053 0.144  0.058 4  REA  0.022 0.049  0.02  0.052 
5  ASEAN  0.173  0.14  0.186 0.115  5  ASEAN  0.025 0.076 0.025 0.035 
6  BGD  0  0.001  0.001 0.004  6  BGD  0  0.019 0.002 0.011 
7 IND  0.121  0  0.097  0.04  7 IND  0.008  0  0.011  0.041 
8  LKA  0.001 0.001 0  0.008 8  LKA  0.001 0.01  0  0.009 
9  RSA  0.017  0.01  0.021 0.013  9  RSA  0.006 0.009 0.017 0.013 
10  NAFTA 0.068  0.134  0.077 0.097  10  NAFTA 0.397 0.225 0.402 0.28 
11  RAMR 0.042 0.085 0.013  0.014 11  RAMR  0.01  0.031  0.02  0.025 
12  EU27  0.122  0.272  0.196 0.207  12  EU27  0.444 0.299 0.318 0.282 
13  REUR  0.032  0.036  0.026 0.039  13  REUR  0.018 0.043 0.042 0.031 
14  MENA 0.053 0.112 0.08  0.238 14  MENA  0.036 0.101  0.069  0.104 
15  SSA  0.01  0.04  0.006 0.023  15  SSA  0.007 0.044 0.007 0.027 
Total (US $ 
millions) 
10306 62295 6726  15228 Total  (US  $ 
millions) 
7921 61126  6528 14388
Source: GTAP database version 6    14
Given these trading patterns, and the fact that intra-South Asian tariffs are not 
significantly higher than those applicable to non-South Asian trading partners, would SAFTA 
as a preferential trading bloc be beneficial to the South Asian countries? Would these 
countries be better off with ‘expanded’ preferential trading blocs such as a SAFTA-ASEAN, 
SAFTA-NAFTA or SAFTA-EU? Would such preferential trading arrangements be a better 
policy option for these countries than unilateral trade liberalization or even a multilateral free 
trade agreement? These policy questions form the basis of the alternative scenarios that are 
experimented with using the GTAP model in this paper. In all eight alternative policy 
scenarios are considered here (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Alternative Scenarios for GTAP Simulations 
Scenario Scenario  description 
1.  SAFTA  South Asia Free Trade Area: All the South Asian countries remove their 
bilateral tariffs, while the tariff rates against countries outside of the region 
remain unchanged, i.e. the case of a SAFTA. 
Extended preferential trading arrangements  
2. SAFTA-
ASEAN 
SAFTA plus extension of preferential trade to ASEAN countries 
3. SAFTA-
NAFTA 
SAFTA plus extension of preferential trade to NAFTA countries 
4. SAFTA-
EU27 
SAFTA plus extension of preferential trade to EU27 countries.  
Full trade liberalisation  
5. UTL  Unilateral Trade Liberalisation by South Asian Countries: All the South Asian 
countries unilaterally remove all their tariffs against all other countries in the 
world, while the rest of the world retains its tariff against South Asia 
6.  MTL  Multilateral Trade Liberalisation: All countries remove border protection 
completely for all the other countries in the world. 
South Asia customs union 
7. SACU5  South Asian Custom Union with 5% Common External Tariff: SAFTA plus all 
the South Asian countries adopt a common external tariff rate of 5% against 
rest of world. 
8. SACU10  South Asian Custom Union with 10% Common External Tariff: SAFTA plus 
all the South Asian countries adopt a common external tariff rate of 10% 
against rest of world. 
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Scenario 1 depicts the case of South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), in which we 
consider the hypothetical case of removal of all import tariffs and export subsidies by the four 
South Asian countries on a preferential basis. That is, we assume that all tariffs and export 
subsidies between the four South Asian trading partners are removed while the same against 
other regions outside South Asia remain unchanged at the base level. This scenario deviates 
from the actual tariff concessions agreed upon by the SAFTA member countries. There are 
three reasons for doing that. First, tariff concessions under SAPTA rounds are moderate. 
Second, the products considered under these rounds are very narrowly defined (at 6-digit HS 
code level) and it is very difficult to aggregate them in a sensible way according to the GTAP 
commodity classification. Third, hypothetical simulations can be used to evaluate the 
possible effects of the SAFTA and to contribute to the debate on the desirability of SAFTA.  
In Scenarios 2, 3 and 4, we consider integration possibilities of SAFTA with three other 
major trade blocs, viz., ASEAN, NAFTA and EU27, respectively. Scenarios 1 to 4 are 
alternative preferential trade scenarios of varying geographical coverage. The impacts of 
these four preferential trade scenarios are evaluated against two broad policy alternatives.  
In the first we consider the case of full trade liberalization by all the South Asian 
countries, either unilaterally (Scenario 5) or as part of a multilateral agreement (Scenario 6). 
In Scenario 5, the four South Asian countries remove all tariffs and export subsidies 
unilaterally vis-à-vis all trading partners, while Scenario 6 is a full blown global free trade 
scenario wherein all countries remove all tariffs and export subsidies vis-à-vis all trading 
partners.
4  
The second broad policy alternative considered here is the case where the South Asian 
countries form a Customs Union wherein they allow free trade amongst themselves while 
maintaining a common external tariff. Two variants are studied here in which the common 
external tariff is set at 5% (Scenario 7) and 10% (Scenario 8). Thus, these two scenarios 
reflect a deeper regional integration than just SAFTA. This has helped us to present a most 
preferred choice of regional integration for South Asian countries.  
In all the GTAP experiments, we assume full employment condition and allow free 
movement of resources across sectors within each country.  
5 Simulation  Results 
Results of the eight scenarios for the four South Asian countries are discussed in sequence 
first. The outcomes are evaluated in terms of their welfare effects, and impacts on sectoral 
output, prices and trade. With regard to the welfare effects, we examine allocative efficiency, 
                                                 
4  First six hypothetical scenarios have adopted from “Jayatilleke S. Bandara, Wusheng Yu (2003) How Desirable is the 
South Asian Free Trade Area? A Quantitative Economic Assessment, The World Economy 26 (9), 1293–1323.” Our 
study is different due to two reason first, we have done the simulations with GTAP version 6 updated database and 
second, regional and sectoral aggregation are different. And last two scenarios are the extension to these.  
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Terms of Trade (TOT), Investment & Saving (IS) effect and GDP Quantity Index (GDP QI) 
as a measure of real GDP. First the simulation results from four preferential options i.e. 
SAFTA, SAFTA-ASEAN (SASEAN), SAFTA-NAFTA (SNAFTA), SAFTA-EU27 (SEU27) 
are discussed; then the results of unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization are presented; 
and lastly results obtained from South Asian Custom Union (SACU) with 5% and 10% CET 
are reported. Table 4 compares the welfare results obtained from different scenarios, while 
Tables 5 to 8 report the results on sectoral output, prices, imports and exports, respectively. 
The final sub-section discusses the aggregate welfare impacts of these eight scenarios on the 
rest of the countries / regions of the world.  
5.1 Scenario  1:  SAFTA 
A South Asian Free Trade Area, as envisaged under the SAFTA scenario, does not result 
in welfare gains for all the member countries (Table 4). SAFTA results in small welfare gains 
for all the South Asian countries except Bangladesh. Rest of South Asia (RSA) gains most by 
about half a billion dollars, while India gains by about US $204 millions and Sri Lanka by 
just US$89 millions only. Bangladesh on the other hand suffers welfare loss of about US$225 
millions. The gains in welfare for RSA, India and Sri Lanka are basically due to gains in 
terms of trade, and to a lesser extent from improvements in allocative efficiency in the case of 
RSA and Sri Lanka. Bangladesh loses out both in terms of allocation efficiency and terms of 
trade by US$104 and US$106 millions, respectively.  
At an aggregate level, only Sri Lanka and RSA witness a marginal rise in real output 
(GDP quantity index reported in Table 4), while Bangladesh witnesses a decline in output 
and there is hardly any change in the output level in India. This aggregate picture, however, 
masks several changes in the output at a sectoral level within each of the country.  
For Bangladesh, removal of tariff barriers reduces the sectoral output in most of the 
commodities except textile which increase by 4.5% (Table 5). Textile has also observed an 
increase in imports and exports by 18.8% and 10.9% respectively (Tables 7 & 8). Higher 
imports have caused price decline in most of the commodities and hence a negative term of 
trade effect (Table 6). These results for Bangladesh are understandable given its high base 
tariff rates in several sectors like textile, agriculture, and manufacturing, and also its 
relatively (within the region) large dependence on India for imports and exports. While the 
other three South Asian countries also have high base tariff rates, especially, India, their 
dependence on the rest of the region especially in highly protected sectors is relatively less. 
Consequently, the TOT movement is not adverse for India, Sri Lanka and RSA.  
Under SAFTA, India witnesses a rise in output by 0.3% in the mining and manufacturing 
sectors, and another 0.1% rise in textiles sector. On the contrary, agro-processing sector 
suffers a loss in output even as the output in agriculture and services sectors is hardly 
affected. Prices of all commodities rise following SAFTA. This is because, under SAFTA 
India’s exports rise equals or exceeds the rise in its imports in all the sectors, which puts an 
upward pressure on prices within India.    17
Table 4: Welfare (US$ millions) and GDP Impacts (% change from base) 
Parameter  SAFTA  SAFTA-ASEAN SAFTA-NAFTA SAFTA-EU27  UTL  MTL SACU 5 SACU 10
Bangladesh                
Allocative efficiency  -104  -75  -19  -152  366  338  348  274 
Terms of Trade  -106  -179  199  -166  -453  -814  -329  -231 
Investment/Savings -16  -42  86  -44  -86  -166  -55  -30 
Total welfare change  -225  -296  266  -362  -173  -641  -36  14 
GDP quantity index  -0.22  -0.16  -0.04  -0.33  0.79  0.73  0.75  0.59 
India                
Allocative efficiency  -3  894  -453  375  5738  5656  5466  4909 
Terms of Trade  209  -1290  17  -1119  -4728 -4415 -3462  -2344 
Investment/Savings -3  8  -13  -6  -108  38 -46  -9 
Total welfare change  204  -389  -448  -751  902  1279  1958  2556 
GDP quantity index  0  0.19  -0.09  0.08  1.21  1.19  1.15  1.03 
Sri Lanka                
Allocative efficiency  10  12  74  25  47  55  24  -23 
Terms of Trade  78  56  399  177  11  123  37  55 
Investment/Savings 1  0  17  3  -6  -1 -1  1 
Total welfare change  89  68  489  206  52  178  61  33 
GDP quantity index  0.06  0.08  0.46  0.16  0.3  0.35  0.15  -0.15 
Rest of S. Asia               
Allocative efficiency  91  223  128  302  951  707  906  803 
Terms of Trade  416  46  647  83  -613  -730  -364  -144 
Investment/Savings 15  0  26  13  -30  -30 -7  9 
Total welfare change  521  269  801  398  308  -52  534  668 
GDP quantity index  0.11  0.26  0.15  0.36  1.13  0.84  1.08  0.95   18
Table 5: Sectoral Output Changes (% change from base)  
Sector  Base (US$ million)  SAFTA SAFTA-ASEAN SAFTA-NAFTA  SAFTA-EU27 UTL MTL SACU 5 SACU 10
Bangladesh                 
AGRI 15032  -0.3  -0.6  -0.8  -0.2  -1.5  -0.7  -0.9  -0.5 
M&M 12190  -1.8  -5.3  -8.7  -2.7  -12.0 -3.4  -9.2  -6.4 
AGPR 10643  -0.7  -1.3  -1.6  -0.9  -3.8  -2.7  -3.0  -2.3 
TXTL 11800  4.5  8.5  13.5  5.6  18.4  7.5  11.9  6.7 
SRVS 43712  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3 
India                  
AGRI 142744  0.0  -0.7  -0.1  0.4  -1.0  -0.3  -0.7  -0.6 
M&M 235060  0.3  1.8  -1.9  -4.4  -2.4  -2.0  -2.7  -2.8 
AGPR 50404  -0.3  -9.7  -1.4  -1.0  -11.8 -10.5  -10.9  -10.1 
TXTL 40770  0.1  5.4  18.0  22.2  25.4  16.1  21.8  18.5 
SRVS 398292  0.0  0.4 0.0  0.2  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.1 
Sri Lanka                  
AGRI 5003  -0.3  -0.5  -1.8  -0.6  -1.0  0.6  -0.4  0.0 
M&M 3203  5.8  5.5  -5.0  -0.5  9.6  12.0  10.5  11.6 
AGPR 1497  -0.8  -2.6  -4.0  -1.4  -5.4  -6.1  -3.2  -1.2 
TXTL 3725  -3.4  -2.8  13.4  3.8  -5.6  -10.9  -8.4  -10.7 
SRVS 8869  0.0  0.3  -0.2  0.0  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.1 
Rest of S. Asia                 
AGRI 27882  0.3  -0.5  0.1  0.7  -1.0  0.9  -0.8  -0.5 
M&M 27695  2.9  3.3  -2.1  -6.2  -9.8  -6.0  -7.7  -5.6 
AGPR 10516  4.4  -8.1  2.0  1.5  -10.7 -9.9  -9.5  -8.4 
TXTL 13493  -8.4  1.3  6.2  12.0  29.7  11.3  23.0  16.9 
SRVS 62416  -0.1  0.3  -0.2  -0.3  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7   19
Table 6: Price Change Index (% change from base)  
Sector  SAFTA  SAFTA-ASEAN SAFTA-NAFTA SAFTA-EU27 UTL  MTL SACU 5 SACU 10
Bangladesh               
AGRI -0.7  -1.6  3.2  -1.3  -3.0  -6.5  -1.8  -0.8 
M&M -0.7  -1.4  2.5  -1.6  -7.0  -10.5  -5.5  -4.0 
AGPR -0.6  -1.4  3.2  -1.3  -2.8  -6.4  -1.7  -0.8 
TXTL -1.4  -2.7  2.1  -2.2  -6.7  -10.0  -5.3  -4.0 
SRVS -0.2  -0.4  4.9  -1.1  -0.3  -5.5  0.0  0.2 
India                
AGRI 0.4  -2.7  1.5  2.0  -4.0  -3.0  -2.9  -1.9 
M&M 0.2  -2.2  -1.1  -0.9  -8.1  -8.7  -5.8  -3.5 
AGPR 0.4  -2.0  1.3  0.6  -3.6  -3.7  -2.6  -1.6 
TXTL 0.3  -1.7  1.0  -0.1  -4.1  -4.4  -2.9  -1.7 
SRVS 0.4  -1.1  1.2  0.0  -2.8  -3.4  -1.8  -0.8 
Sri Lanka               
AGRI 1.2  0.4  5.4  3.3  -0.3  5.0  0.1  0.5 
M&M 1.9  1.5  6.6  3.1  1.3  1.8  2.4  3.5 
AGPR 1.1  0.2  8.1  3.5  -0.4  1.4  -0.6  -1.0 
TXTL 1.3  0.9  6.6  2.9  0.6  0.7  1.6  2.5 
SRVS 2.0  1.7  9.4  4.3  1.9  2.8  1.5  1.0 
Rest of S. Asia                
AGRI 4.5  0.1  6.4  7.5  0.4  2.2  1.9  3.2 
M&M 1.8  0.5  2.3  1.3  -4.9  -6.7  -2.5  -0.2 
AGPR 3.6  0.4  5.7  5.5  0.8  -0.6  2.1  3.3 
TXTL 2.9  0.4  5.0  4.1  0.2  -2.2  1.7  3.0 
SRVS 3.3  1.2  5.6  4.5  1.8  -1.6  2.9  4.1   20
Table 7: Change in Imports (%)  
Sector Base  (US$  million)  SAFTA SAFTA-ASEAN SAFTA-NAFTA SAFTA-EU27 UTL MTL SACU 5 SACU 10
Bangladesh                 
AGRI 1023  7.4  10.1  21.3  6.1  16.4 -1.4  9.2  3.4 
M&M 5675  5.4  12.6  13.9  8.2  24.2 16.4 17.8  12.1 
AGPR 879  6.3  18.8  16.5  6.7  38.4 23.9 30.3  23.0 
TXTL 1982  18.8  35.4  37.7  20.5  81.5 57.5 64.2  49.9 
SRVS 747  -0.7  -1.3  9.8  -2.5  -0.9  -10.5 -8.7  -15.8 
India                  
AGRI 2370  7.9  22.7  31.3  21.2  56.5 50.2 44.9  34.6 
M&M 44821  3.2  12.2  17.3  33.2  51.8 53.9 40.3  30.4 
AGPR 2227  25.3  214.8  41.3  53.0  226.7 220.3 203.6  182.9 
TXTL 1075  10.4  36.7  26.2  49.7  109.1 112.6 84.6  64.1 
SRVS 11803  0.8  -1.2  2.3  0.1  -3.2  -4.0  -9.1  -14.4 
Sri Lanka                  
AGRI 390  13.9  17.5  23.6  18.8  21.0 27.1 15.2  10.0 
M&M 3630  4.3  5.8  10.9  7.5  10.4 11.3 6.0  2.1 
AGPR 387  11.4  19.3  28.9  18.4  29.9 31.9 20.9  12.8 
TXTL 1427  -1.0  -0.4  18.6  6.7  -1.7  -4.8  -6.8  -11.1 
SRVS 892  2.0  1.7  9.5  4.2  2.1  2.8  -2.5  -6.8 
Rest of S. Asia                 
AGRI 1043  13.9  9.1  27.9  27.2  40.2 38.7 31.0  23.1 
M&M 9898  10.7  12.6  15.8  20.8  32.3 28.0 25.8  20.2 
AGPR 1008  23.4  83.7  33.4  28.8  97.5 89.0 86.6  77.0 
TXTL 622  20.0  33.4  36.8  46.4  103.0 76.7 80.6  62.5 
SRVS 2656  5.2  2.2  9.4  7.6  4.1  -1.6  -2.0  -7.4   21
Table 8: Change in Exports (%)  
Sector  Base (US$ million)  SAFTA SAFTA-ASEAN SAFTA-NAFTA  SAFTA-EU27 UTL MTL SACU 5 SACU 10
Bangladesh                 
AGRI 138  44.1  32.7  21.9  54.6  21.1  42.8  24.4  28.2 
M&M 930  8.5  18.4  -14.2  13.4  21.2  71.7  14.0  8.2 
AGPR 317  3.7  30.3  -13.9  7.5  15.1  25.8  9.1  4.1 
TXTL 5678  10.9  21.2  28.0  12.8  54.1  33.0  39.9  28.2 
SRVS 858  0.3  0.7  -17.9  3.6  -0.9  20.5  -1.4  -1.7 
India                  
AGRI 3166  5.2  24.7  2.5  23.0  27.3  62.0  22.6  18.7 
M&M 28819  5.2  20.7  8.5  22.1  60.6  69.5  44.3  30.6 
AGPR 3751  9.1  34.7  6.4  22.9  22.3  36.2  18.0  14.1 
TXTL 12401  0.8  16.6  49.5  63.6  77.6  53.3  65.6  54.8 
SRVS 12426  -1.6  3.7  -4.5  0.0  9.8  12.4  6.1  2.6 
Sri Lanka                  
AGRI 966  2.1  4.2  -9.5  0.4  5.4  16.4  5.2  5.4 
M&M 1272  16.0  17.2  -2.7  5.2  32.2  39.3  29.3  27.6 
AGPR 128  7.8  6.9  -20.1  9.5  2.7  -8.4  5.5  8.9 
TXTL 2972  -3.3  -2.6  18.3  5.7  -5.3  -11.1  -10.0  -14.0 
SRVS 1136  -7.4  -6.4  -29.2  -15.2  -8.0  -11.5  -5.9  -3.6 
Rest of S. Asia                 
AGRI 683  18.8  30.6  5.6  36.1  17.0  148.9 14.9  13.6 
M&M 2066  65.7  73.4  35.9  21.6  41.3  72.9  34.4  30.1 
AGPR 963  66.7  10.8  48.9  46.0  0.9  8.4  0.4  0.3 
TXTL 7287  -11.1  4.1  10.3  23.4  55.2  24.8  43.0  32.3 
SRVS 2971  -11.2  -4.4  -18.1  -15.1  -7.1  5.0  -10.6  -13.8   22
In Sri Lanka only the mining and manufacturing sector witnesses a rise in output, while 
agriculture, agro-processing and textiles sector suffer loss of output following a move to 
SAFTA. Not surprisingly domestic prices rise, even as imports rise in agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing and agro-processing sectors.  
RSA’s exports show a steep rise in three commodities i.e. agricultural (18.8%) 
manufacturing (65.7%) and agro-processing (66.7%). RSA’s textile output declines under 
SAFTA by -8.4%. As a result of these sectoral changes price rise in RSA is sharpest within 
the region.  
One of the main considerations behind the formation of SAFTA is that it would promote 
trade within region. Indeed the results of the SAFTA scenario do suggest that intra-regional 
trade will rise dramatically (Table 9). Total intra-regional imports at c.i.f. prices rise almost 
three times from about US$ 4 billions to about US$ 11.5 billions following SAFTA. Imports 
by Bangladesh, India and RSA from each of the regional trade partners rise by well over 
100%. The biggest jump is in India’s imports from RSA by almost US$ 3 billions, followed 
by Bangladesh’s imports from India (US$ 1.6 billions) and RSA’s imports from India (US$ 
1.4 billions). At a commodity level, Other Crops, Agro-processing, Textiles and Other 
Manufactures witness large rise in intra-regional trade (Appendix Table A7).  
 
Table 9: Intra-regional trade in South Asia (US$ millions) 
 Base  values SAFTA  (Scenario  2) 
Exporting Importing  country  Importing  country 
country Bangladesh  India  Sri 
Lanka
RSA Total Bangladesh India Sri 
Lanka 
RSA Total
Bangladesh   64.3  4.9  53.3 122.5   137.8 6.9  105.3  250 
India  1250    653.8 616.3 2520.1 2849    985.5 2026.4  5860.9
Sri Lanka  15.2  79    120  214.2 56.8  388.6   367  812.4
RSA 174.8  631.4  143.5  202.2 1151.9 623.6  3618  194.2  174.1  4609.9
Total 1440  774.7  802.2  991.8 4008.7 3529.4  4144.4 1186.6  2672.8  11533
Note:  Bilateral imports at c.i.f. prices are reported.  
 
In sum, SAFTA scenario presents a mixed picture. It is clear that SAFTA may not result 
in a win-win situation for all its member countries, with Bangladesh suffering significant 
welfare losses even as other members gain, albeit modestly in relation to their base GDP. 
This imbalance in the impacts across member countries may not be politically acceptable, 
especially in Bangladesh. However, intra-regional trade does rise significantly, which is 
likely to improve regional co-operation amongst members and bring with a peace dividend 
for its members that could out weigh the economic benefits. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to 
explore other policy options that might be economically beneficial to all the member 
countries even without compromising increased intra-regional trade and the non-economic 
benefits that it might bring along. Towards this we next examine if integration of SAFTA   23
with other major trading blocs in the world be welfare improving for all the South Asian 
countries. We start with the case of SAFTA-ASEAN integration, followed by SAFTA-
NAFTA and SAFTA-EU27.  
5.2  Scenario 2: SAFTA–ASEAN  
In general, a combined SAFTA–ASEAN free trade bloc is expected to have a negative 
impact on the region’s welfare (Table 4). The move from SAFTA to SAFTA-ASEAN results 
in an additional welfare loss of about US$ 71 millions for Bangladesh, while India, Sri Lanka 
and RSA suffer an erosion of the welfare gains that SAFTA brings them. Indeed, India loses 
more than half a billion dollars, which turns the situation from one of welfare gain under 
SAFTA to a situation of welfare loss of about US$389 millions under SAFTA-ASEAN.  
For all the South Asian countries, the welfare loss arises out of adverse movement in the 
TOT that this scenario brings about. All these countries witness a decline in prices in all 
sectors compared to the SAFTA scenario (Table 6). As seen earlier, ASEAN is a major 
trading partner for all the South Asian countries and all of them have high base tariff rates 
vis-à-vis ASEAN.  
Aggregate output, however, expands in all the South Asian countries (output loss in 
Bangladesh is less in this scenario than under SAFTA). At a sectoral level, the results are 
somewhat mixed (Table 5). In all the South Asian countries, textiles output level is expected 
increase when integrating with ASEAN. Output of mining and manufacturing sectors in India 
and in RSA rises. SAFTA-ASEAN also results in a marginal increase in services output in all 
these countries.  
With the integration of SAFTA with ASEAN imports are expected to increase. In 
particular, imports of agro-processing products into India and RSA rise dramatically by 214% 
and 84%, respectively, mostly from ASEAN countries. Large rise in textiles and 
manufacturing imports is also seen into Bangladesh, India and RSA, and agricultural imports 
into Bangladesh and India.
5 Exports by the South Asian countries too witness significant rise 
in this scenario compared to the case of SAFTA alone (Table 8).  
5.3  Scenario 3: SAFTA–NAFTA  
A preferential trading arrangement between SAFTA and NAFTA is expected to bring 
welfare gains for all South Asian countries except India (Table 4). Indeed the welfare gains 
for Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and RSA are the highest in this scenario amongst all the eight 
scenarios studied here. Favourable terms of trade are the most important source of welfare 
gains in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and RSA, followed by improvements in allocative efficiency 
                                                 
5  Here it’s important to note that India maintains a long list of sensitive sectors with ASEAN and Indian industries might 
get a big hit from imports following an FTA with ASEAN. The implementation of Early Harvest Scheme (EHS) for 84 
commodities under India-Thailand FTA has already resulted in huge imports from not only from Thailand but also from 
ASEAN due to ineffective Rules of Origin (ROOs) and consequently loses for Indian industries, in general and for auto 
industry and Colour TV industry, in particular (Sahay and Saini, 2006).    24
especially in Sri Lanka and RSA. For India too, terms of trade improves marginally, but is 
inadequate to compensate the welfare loss due to reallocation of resources.  
The terms of trade improvement for the South Asian countries is primarily due to the 
sharp increase in textiles exports Textiles is a major export item for all these countries, and 
NAFTA’s base tariffs, which are very low in general, are highest for textiles (the rates for 
South Asia range from 10.4 to 12.8). Removal of these tariffs by NAFTA results in sharp rise 
in exports from the already high base levels in all the South Asian countries. The sharp rise in 
textiles output required to meet the surge in exports, entails dramatic reallocation of factors 
across sectors and, given our assumption of full employment of all factors, puts an upward 
pressure on factor prices (especially wages of unskilled labour) in all these countries.
6 Rising 
factor prices drives up domestic prices of all commodities in all these countries, with the 
exception of manufacturing sector prices in India.  
The fall in the price of manufacturing sector in India is understandable given the large 
rise in her imports in this scenario. India had high base tariffs on these goods (24% - 
Appendix Table A4) imports and imported substantial amounts of these goods from NAFTA 
(about 12.2%; Source: GTAP database version 6.0). This leads to a 1.9% decline in output, 
which is large given the high base output level for this sector in India.  
The results of this scenario highlight the contrasts within South Asia. What turns out to be 
highly beneficial for a three of the countries within this region is not beneficial at all to the 
largest country in this region, raising doubts about the feasibility of such an extended 
preferential trading bloc between SAFTA and NAFTA.  
5.4  Scenario 4: SAFTA–EU27  
This scenario of an enhanced preferential trade bloc between SAFTA and EU27 yields a 
different set of winners and losers in terms of welfare amongst the South Asian countries. 
Bangladesh, India and RSA suffer welfare loss in this scenario than under SAFTA (though it 
is still welfare improving for RSA when compared with the base case), while Sri Lanka gains 
in welfare under this scenario. Indeed, at US$ 362 and 751 millions, respectively, welfare 
loses for Bangladesh and India are highest in this scenario amongst the four preferential 
trading scenarios studied here.  
The source of welfare loss/gains differ across these countries. Bangladesh is likely to lose 
due both to an adverse terms of trade and allocative efficiency. For India (Sri Lanka), adverse 
(favourable) terms of trade is the main source of welfare loss (gain). Compared to the SAFTA 
scenario, RSA’s welfare gain is basically due to improvements in allocative efficiency, while 
the contribution of terms of trade effect is positive but lower than under SAFTA.  
The reasons behind these results are fairly easy to understand. EU27 is a major trading 
partner for all the four South Asian countries. The relative importance of different 
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commodities, both on the export and import side, and the base tariff structure in the EU and 
in these four countries present a mixed picture. In the case of Bangladesh, India and RSA, the 
base tariffs applicable for imports from EU27 are high for most commodities, including 
major imports such as for some agricultural and agro-processed products, and other 
manufactures. In contrast, Sri Lanka’s base tariffs on its major imports from EU27 are 
generally low. Consequently, tariff removal by the South Asian countries for EU27 products 
has greater impacts for Bangladesh, India and RSA than for Sri Lanka. Imports rise 
substantially in many of these products in Bangladesh, India and RSA. In contrast, the rise in 
Sri Lanka’s imports are relatively smaller.  
EU27’s base tariffs for the South Asian countries are low on most commodities except 
cereals (from all the four countries), agro-processed products (from India, Sri Lanka and 
RSA)  and textiles products (from India and Sri Lanka). Amongst these few high tariff items 
EU27’s major imports from South Asia includes cereals (from India and RSA), and textiles 
(from all the four countries). Thus, tariff removal by EU27 for the South Asian countries 
brings benefits mainly to the textiles sector in these countries, that too primarily for India, 
and to the cereals sector in India and RSA.  
As a result of these changes in trade flows, prices decline in Bangladesh more than in the 
SAFTA case, and consequently output declines in all the sectors (except Textiles) and in the 
aggregate as well. In India, the mining and manufacturing sectors witness declining prices 
and substantial loss in output. In Sri Lanka prices of all sectors rise more than in SAFTA case 
but only the Textiles sector witnesses a rise in output, which more than offsets the output loss 
in agriculture and mining and manufacturing sectors.  
The output and price impacts in RSA are similar to that seen earlier for Bangladesh in the 
SAFTA-NAFTA scenario. The surge in textiles export from RSA in this scenario triggers a 
very large rise in textiles output, which in turn rises the demand for unskilled labour in the 
textiles sector. Given our specification of full employment closure unskilled labour wages 
rises in this scenario by nearly 6.5% over base levels, resulting in price rise in all sectors of 
the economy.  
5.5  Scenario 5: Unilateral Trade Liberlisation  
None of the above four preferential trading scenarios in which the South Asian countries 
liberalise trade with specific trading partners on a reciprocal basis brings welfare gains for all 
the countries of the region. As an alternative, would full trade liberalisation by the South 
Asian countries benefit all of them? Would the impacts vary depending upon whether the 
South Asian countries embark upon full trade liberalisation unilaterally or as part of an 
multilateral trade agreement. The case of unilateral trade liberalisation (UTL) by all the South 
Asian countries is discussed in this section, while the next section examines the case of 
multilateral trade liberalisation (MTL).    26
Full trade liberalisation carried out unilaterally by the South Asian countries has 
differential welfare impacts on them. Bangladesh suffers welfare losses, while India, Sri 
Lanka and RSA gain in welfare. Welfare loss (gain) for Bangladesh (Sri Lanka and RSA) 
under UTL is, however, less than under SAFTA. For India UTL is clearly a better option than 
SAFTA or any of the other preferential trading arrangements studied earlier. Interestingly, all 
the South Asian countries lose heavily due to adverse terms of trade compared to the SAFTA 
case. Gains in allocative efficiency mutes or surpasses the loss due to adverse terms of trade 
for all of them.  
The adverse terms of trade suffered by them is not surprising given their generally high 
base tariffs on most commodities. Two way trade is expected to grow much faster under UTL 
than under any of the preferential trade scenarios. Higher imports in this scenario causes 
prices to decline sharply. Indeed, prices of all the commodities in all the South Asian 
countries are lower in UTL than under SAFTA. For Sri Lanka and RSA, though prices of 
several commodities are higher than base levels, the extent of price rise is less than under the 
preferential trade scenarios.  
Exports too rise dramatically for many commodities in all the South Asian countries. 
Notable are the cases of textiles in Bangladesh, India and RSA, and mining and 
manufacturing in India Sri Lanka and RSA. Significant rise in agricultural exports too take 
place under UTL unlike in the preferential trading scenarios. The rise in exports, however, 
does not lead to a rise in output in all these cases. In fact, output of many commodities 
decline all across the region. Output rises primarily in the textiles sector in Bangladesh, India 
and RSA, and in the mining and manufacturing sector in Sri Lanka. These changes in the 
output composition results in efficiency gains that dampens (dominates) the welfare loss due 
to adverse terms of trade in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (India and RSA) compared to SAFTA.  
To sum up, UTL too producers winners and losers amongst the South Asian countries, 
and does not seem to be a welfare improving policy option for them except for India.  
5.6 Scenario  6:  Multilateral Trade Liberlisation  
In this scenario, the South Asian countries undertake trade liberalisation as part of a 
global agreement under which all countries remove all import tariffs and export subsidies vis-
à-vis all other countries. Results of this multilateral trade liberalisation (MTL) scenario are 
for most part qualitatively similar to those of UTL seen above, but interesting variations at 
the commodity level emerge, especially with regard to the trade flows.  
As with the scenarios seen so far, multilateral trade liberalisation (MTL) too producers 
winners and losers amongst the South Asian countries. India and Sri Lanka gain in welfare to 
the tune of US$ 1279 and 178 millions, respectively, while Bangladesh and RSA suffer 
welfare loss of about US$ 641 and 52 millions, respectively (Table 4). The welfare gains for 
India and Sri Lanka and the welfare loss for Bangladesh are more in this scenario than under 
UTL and also SAFTA. For RSA, the situation changes from welfare gain under UTL or any   27
of the preferential trading scenarios seen earlier to welfare loss in this scenario. Amongst the 
eight scenarios considered here welfare loss is highest in this scenario for Bangladesh, and 
this is the only scenario wherein RSA suffers welfare losses. Thus, MTL is a superior option 
for India and Sri Lanka compared to both UTL and also SAFTA, but not for Bangladesh and 
RSA.  
All the South Asian countries suffer adverse terms of trade under this scenario, which is 
compensated partially or more than fully by gains in allocative efficiency. Removal of tariffs 
results in a surge in imports of almost all the commodities into all the South Asian countries, 
as was the case in UTL. However, this does not lead to declining prices in all the 
commodities in all the countries as seen earlier under UTL. This is primarily because 
interesting deviations in the results are seen in the export basket of these countries. While 
exports of several commodities rise, Textiles does not lead the export surge in Bangladesh, 
India and RSA in this scenario as was the case in UTL and all the preferential trading 
scenarios. This could be because in this scenario where all countries liberalise trade, the 
South Asian countries could be facing greater competition in textiles sector from other 
countries. Consequently, output expansion is lower in MTL than in UTL, though the sectoral 
pattern of change in output remains similar to that in UTL in all the South Asian countries.  
The MTL scenario brings out the true state of comparative advantages and disadvantages 
faced by the South Asian countries. It also reveals that not all the countries of the region 
would benefit from a global free trade regime. From the perspective of this study that focuses 
on the potential for coordinated trade policies in South Asia, full free trade whether carried 
out unilaterally or in a multilateral framework is not an uniformly superior alternative for all 
the member states. In the following sections we examine the potential for economic 
cooperation in South Asia in forming a customs union with alternative rates of common 
external tariffs (CET) at 5% (Scenario 7) and 10% (Scenario 8).  
5.7  Scenario 7: SACU 5 
This scenario involves deeper regional integration in South Asia wherein the countries 
establish a free trade zone (SAFTA) and a customs union with a CET of 5% on all 
commodities against all non-regional trading partners. Given the high base tariffs on several 
commodities, especially in Bangladesh, India and RSA, this scenario still involves large tariff 
cuts by the South Asian countries against the rest of the world.  
The combination of SAFTA plus a customs union with 5% CET appears to be a better 
option for Bangladesh, India and RSA than just SAFTA alone or full trade liberalisation 
(UTL / MTL) though Bangladesh still loses in terms of aggregate welfare. The loss in welfare 
for Bangladesh at just US$ 36 millions is much less than in either the SAFTA or in MTL. 
India, Sri Lanka and RSA gain in welfare in this scenario compared to base levels. The gains 
for India and RSA in this scenario are much higher than under SAFTA or full trade 
liberalisation, whereas the converse is happens for Sri Lanka.    28
All the South Asian countries except Sri Lanka continue to suffer adverse terms of trade 
following the large cuts in tariffs mentioned earlier. However, gains in allocative efficiency 
more than compensates the loss due to terms of trade. Turning to the movements in imports, 
exports, prices and output, the pattern that emerges is that the changes (rise / fall) in this 
scenario are less than under UTL
7 but more than under SAFTA. The domination of textiles in 
the changes to the export basket and in the output composition continues in this scenario also.  
5.8  Scenario 8: SACU 10 
This scenario is similar in design to the previous one except that the CET is fixed at 10%. 
Even at this level of CET this scenario involves substantial tariff cut in many commodities by 
Bangladesh, India and RSA from their high base levels, while for Sri Lanka some of the 
tariffs actually rise. Consequently, the impacts for Sri Lanka are qualitatively (and 
quantitatively) different from those for Bangladesh, India and RSA.  
Aggregate welfare increases in all the four South Asian countries in this scenario 
compared to base levels (Table 4). It is noteworthy that this is the only scenario amongst the 
eight alternative studied here where this happens. There is, however, enormous variation in 
the welfare gains across countries, from a paltry US$ 14 millions for Bangladesh to slightly 
over US$ 2.5 billions for India. As expected, Bangladesh, India and RSA suffer adverse 
terms of trade due to the tariff cuts in this scenario, which results in a rise in imports and a 
fall in prices of several major commodities. However, the fall in price in this scenario is less 
than in the previous scenario where the CET was only 5%. Welfare gains for these three 
countries are largely due to gains in allocative efficiency, which more than offsets the loss 
due to adverse terms of trade. The results for Sri Lanka are exactly opposite. Terms of trade 
improves as many of Sri Lanka’s tariffs increase, and this additional tariff protection results 
in a loss in allocative efficiency that dampens some of the welfare gains due to favourable 
terms of trade. Overall, the trade pattern, price and production behaviour is not much 
different from that under SACU5.  
As mentioned above, this is the only scenario amongst all the eight scenarios considered 
in this study wherein all the four South Asian countries enjoy welfare gains compared to base 
levels. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that this scenario is the best for regional 
cooperation in South Asia. First of all, welfare gains vary substantially across the countries in 
this scenario. Secondly, welfare gain is not the highest in this scenario for Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka and RSA, but in an expanded preferential trade between SAFTA and NAFTA. In fact 
for Sri Lanka, the welfare gains of US$ 33 millions in this scenario is the lowest amongst all 
the eight scenarios studied here. On the contrary, the gains for India are highest in this 
scenario. In a situation where the largest country in the region gains most while the other 
                                                 
7  Note that the UTL scenario can also be interpreted as SAFTA plus South Asian Customs Union with 0% CET, and thus 
varies from the present scenario only with respect to the CET specified.    29
smaller countries gain little (though they do not suffer losses) is unlikely to propel all the 
countries of the region to work towards a common trade policy as described in this scenario.  
5.9  Welfare Impacts on Other Regions  
Thus far we have discussed the results from the perspective of the four South Asian 
countries. What are the impacts of these scenarios on the other countries / regions of the 
world? This especially relevant for the three extended preferential trading scenarios, viz., 
SAFTA-ASEAN, SAFTA-NAFTA and SAFTA-EU27. While the GTAP model does provide 
detailed results for all the countries, we confine the discussion here to the aggregate welfare 
impacts on the other countries in the eight scenarios. Table 10 reports the changes in 
aggregate welfare across all the eight scenarios for all 15 the countries / regions that we have 
considered here.  
As expected, SAFTA does not bring welfare gains for any of the non-member countries, 
which is consistent with theory. Similarly, the three extended preferential trading scenarios, 
viz., SAFTA-ASEAN, SAFTA-NAFTA and SAFTA-EU27, benefit only to that particular 
participating region amongst the non-South Asian countries, viz., ASEAN, NAFTA and 
EU27, respectively. In contrast, the two full trade liberalisation scenarios (UTL and MTL) 
and the two South Asia customs union scenarios (SACU5 and SACU10) bring welfare gains 
to several other non-South Asian countries. Notable amongst the gainers is Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). Surprisingly, China and Japan, both major trading powers, do not gain in 
welfare from any of these scenarios except the full global free trade scenario (MTL).  
6 Conclusion 
Regional economic cooperation in South Asia has historically been a half hearted halting 
attempt at best despite efforts over more than two decades. The agreement to establish a 
South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) is an attempt to accelerate cooperation amongst 
member states. The advisability and potential of SAFTA has, however, been questioned both 
theoretically and empirically. Theoretical objections have centred around the potential trade 
diversion that can take place following the establishment of SAFTA. Empirical doubts have 
been expressed over the agreement’s potential to expand trade within the region due to the 
limited complementarities that exist amongst the countries of the region. This paper attempts 
to evaluate the Pareto optimality of SAFTA for all the member states. Besides, the welfare 
optimality of three other alternative sets of coordinated trade policies that go beyond SAFTA 
has also been studied here. These include (a) extended preferential trading between SAFTA 
and three other major trading blocs (ASEAN, NAFTA and EU27), (b) coordinated full trade 
liberalisation (carried out unilaterally or as part of a multilateral agreement) by South Asian 
countries, and (c) SAFTA plus a customs union (two variants with 5% and 10% CET). The 
analysis has been carried out using the standard static GTAP model, a global computable 
general equilibrium model, with 15 countries / regions and 11 sectors. GTAP has been widely    30
Table 10: Aggregate Welfare Change (US$ millions) 
Country / region  SAFTA  SAFTA-ASEAN SAFTA-NAFTA SAFTA-EU27 UTL  MTL  SACU 5 SACU 10
ANZ -19  -55  -76  -106  398  3874  320  251 
CHN -13  -242  -372  -421  -164  10767 -165  -162 
JPN -65  -501  -184  -269  -74  12164 -58  -39 
REA -58  -334  -252  -265  102  15211 4  -80 
ASEAN -83  3247  -389 -468  1247  4302  985  751 
BGD -225  -296  266  -362  -173  -641  -36  14 
IND 204  -389  -448  -751  902  1279  1958  2556 
LKA 89  68  489  206  52  178  61  33 
RSA 521  269  801  398  308  -52  534  668 
NAFTA -172  -119  1095 -575  696  -161  428  202 
RAMR -28  -250 -391  -224  68  3653  -1  -61 
EU27 -191  -494  -884  5128  2256  17710 1756  1323 
REUR -22  -6  -183  -458  185  1672  96  17 
MENA -39  -3  -420  -747  862  1407  578  325 
SSA -29  -88  -113  -223  600  -98  452  321 
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used in recent years due to its consistent database at the global level. The GTAP model and 
the database are known to some limitations, and the results of this study are also subject to 
these limitations. In all eight scenarios (including SAFTA) have been simulated here 
assuming complete factor mobility across all sectors in each of the South Asian countries. 
The results in this study might underestimate welfare gains since the standard static GTAP 
model does not capture possible dynamic effects (e.g. capital accumulation and technology 
changes) of trade policy changes.  
Within these limitations, the results clearly bring out the dilemma that confronts the South 
Asian countries. Each of the eight scenarios considered here show that there would be 
winners and losers amongst the member states, and that the winners and losers vary across 
scenarios, though the gains / losses as the case may be are not very large.  
SAFTA per se is likely to result in welfare loss of US$ 225 millions for Bangladesh, 
while India, Sri Lanka and Rest of South Asia are likely to gain by US$ 204, 89 and 521 
millions, respectively. It must be noted here that these welfare impacts have been worked out 
under assumptions of full factor mobility across sectors in all the South Asian countries. 
Allowing for rigidities in factor mobility across sector would only reduce the welfare gains 
and increase the welfare losses. It would not alter the fact that there are winners and losers 
amongst the South Asian countries in this (and other) scenario(s). Thus, SAFTA does not 
appear to be a Pareto superior policy option for the region as a whole. Nevertheless, our 
results also point out that intra-regional trade in South Asia rises by nearly three times – from 
a base level of about US$ 4 billions to US$ 11.5 billions under SAFTA.  
A coordinated move by the South Asian countries to extend preferential trading under 
SAFTA to ASEAN, NAFTA or EU27 is unlikely to benefit all the countries of South Asia. 
Preferential trading between SAFTA and ASEAN results in a welfare loss for all the South 
Asian countries compared to SAFTA, while ASEAN gains in welfare. Extending preferential 
trading to cover SAFTA and NAFTA hurts India but benefits the other three countries of the 
region and NAFTA. In contrast, EU-27 and Sri Lanka are the main beneficiary in a combined 
SAFTA-EU27 preferential trading bloc while the rest of the countries from South Asia lose. 
Thus, SAFTA and other extended preferential trading arrangements are not Pareto optimal 
for the countries of South Asia.  
Nor is a move by South Asian countries to a full free trade regime, whether done 
unilaterally or as part of a multilateral agreement, beneficial to all the countries of the region. 
India and Sri Lanka gain from a global free trade regime, though the gains are not the highest 
amongst alternative scenarios for both of them. In contrast, Bangladesh and RSA suffer most 
from a global free trade regime.  
Similarly, efforts at establishing a South Asian free trade are along with a customs union 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world is unlikely to maximize welfare for all the countries. Although 
a customs union with 10% CET results in welfare gains for all the South Asian countries, this 
is not the best scenario from the perspective of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and RSA. Indeed, the   32
dilemma confronting these countries is that the welfare maximising scenario differs for India 
on one side and Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and RSA on the other side. For India, a South Asia 
Customs Union with 10% CET brings maximum gains, while for the other three countries it 
is an extended SAFTA-NAFTA preferential trade bloc that brings maximum gains.  
Thus, the welfare basis for establishing SAFTA or for deeper trade policy coordination is 
not very strong. Nor is it obvious that economic cooperation in South Asia would be 
forthcoming given these anticipated welfare impacts. Nevertheless, economic cooperation in 
South Asia may be desirable for other non-economic reasons. Our results do point to greater 
intra-regional trade in South Asia. Strengthening of trade links may help smoothen political 
frictions amongst the South Asian countries. The “peace dividend”, such as a reduction in 
military expenditure, that could follow may far outweigh the direct economic benefits, and 
economic cooperation amongst South Asian countries may still be justified.  
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Appendix Table A1 Region Aggregation  
No. Code  Region  description  Comprising 
1 ANZ  Australia  New  Zealand 
Oceania 
Australia; New Zealand; Rest of Oceania  
2  CHN  CHN - China  China  
3 JPN  Japan  Japan   
4  REA  Rest of East Asia  Hong Kong; Korea; Taiwan; Rest of East Asia 
5  ASEAN  ASEAN  Indonesia; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; 
Vietnam; Rest of Southeast Asia 
6 BGD  Bangladesh  Bangladesh   
7 IND  India  India   
8  LKA  Sri Lanka  Sri Lanka  
9  RSA  Rest of South Asia  Rest of South Asia  
10  NAFTA  North American Free 
Trade Area 
Canada; United States; Mexico  
11  RAMR  Rest of Americas  Rest of North America; Colombia; Peru; Venezuela; Rest of 
Andean Pact; Argentina; Brazil; Chile; Uruguay; Rest of 
South America; Central America; Rest of FTAA; Rest of 
the Caribbean  
12  EU27  European Union 27  Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; 
United Kingdom; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; 
Netherlands; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Cyprus; Czech 
Republic; Hungary; Malta; Poland; Romania; Slovakia; 
Slovenia; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania  
13  REUR  Rest of Europe  Switzerland; Rest of EFTA; Rest of Europe; Albania; 
Bulgaria; Croatia; Russian Federation; Rest of Former 
Soviet Union; Turkey  
14 MENA  Middle  East  North 
Africa 
Rest of Middle East; Morocco; Tunisia; Rest of North 
Africa  
15  SSA  Sub Saharan Africa  Botswana; South Africa; Rest of South African CU; 
Malawi; Mozambique; Tanzania; Zambia; Zimbabwe; Rest 
of SADC; Madagascar; Uganda; Rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa    36
 
Appendix Table A2: Commodity Aggregation  
No. Code  Commodity  description  Comprising 
1  CRLS  Cereals  Paddy rice; Wheat; Cereal grains nec  
2  OCRPS  Other crops  Vegetables, fruit, nuts; Oil seeds; Sugar cane, sugar beet; 
Plant-based fibres; Crops nec  
3  ANML  Animal products incl 
fishing 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses; Animal products nec; Raw milk; 
Wool, silk-worm cocoons; Fishing  
4  NRES  Natural Resources  Forestry; Coal; Oil; Gas; Minerals nec  
5  AGPR  Agro processing  Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse; Meat products nec; 
Vegetable oils and fats; Dairy products; Processed rice; 
Sugar; Food products nec; Beverages and tobacco products  
6  TXTL  Textiles and garments  Textiles; Wearing apparel  
7  PETR  Petroleum and coal 
products 
Petroleum, coal products  
8  OMNF  Other manufactures  Paper products, publishing; Leather products; Wood 
products; Chemical, rubber, plastic prods; Mineral products 
nec; Ferrous metals; Metals nec; Metal products; Motor 
vehicles and parts; Transport equipment nec; Electronic 
equipment; Machinery and equipment nec; Manufactures nec 
9 CNSTRN  Construction  Construction   
10  MRGNS  Margin services  Trade; Transport nec; Sea transport; Air transport; 
Communication  
11  OSRVS  Other services  Electricity; Gas manufacture, distribution; Water; Financial 
services nec; Insurance; Business services nec; Recreation 
and other services; PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat; 
Dwellings  
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Appendix Table A3: Bilateral import tariffs of Bangladesh, 2001  
Sector  ANZ CHN JPN REA ASEAN BGD IND LKA RSA NAFTA RAMR EU27 REUR MENA SSA
CRLS 5.0  0.0  5.0  0.9 4.8 0.0 4.7 0.0 2.0 5.1 0.5  5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0
OCRPS 5.7  25.4  4.6  6.0 11.4 0.0 17.2 34.7 3.9 2.9 5.9  8.7 0.4 3.6 4.1
ANML 2.5  5.0  24.6  12.7  17.8 0.0 25.0 12.5 0.4 23.9 6.2  10.3 0.9 8.9 10.6
NRES 16.0  6.0  5.9  19.2  3.5 0.0 9.5 0.0 11.5 4.9 0.2  13.3 3.6 29.6 6.1
AGPR 32.5  18.2  21.9  26.4 23.3 0.0 17.1 27.5 9.9 15.6 15.7  27.1 31.6 26.9 26.0
TXTL 20.3  35.1  28.8  32.1 26.5 0.0 16.7 29.7 32.0 26.1 23.8  31.7 28.9 21.9 23.3
PETR 32.9  23.1  29.8  28.7  32.6 0.0 33.0 0.0 30.2 29.7 0.0  27.0 20.8 15.6 30.1
OMNF 8.8  15.2  16.7  17.2  18.4 0.0 16.2 20.9 17.1 8.5 14.4  10.8 10.5 19.0 12.3
CNSTRN 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MRGNS 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OSRVS 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: GTAP database version 6.0 
 
Appendix Table A4: Bilateral import tariffs of India, 2001  
Sector  ANZ CHN JPN REA ASEAN BGD IND LKA RSA NAFTA RAMR EU27 REUR MENA SSA
CRLS 68.5  49.7  0.0  0.0 11.7 79.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.0 52.0  4.0 0.0 0.1 10.3
OCRPS 27.0  34.1  11.8  18.5  37.3 18.4 0.0 19.9 37.4 25.9 6.1  31.0 23.0 30.6 21.0
ANML 14.9  17.8  17.5  14.1  17.1 1.0 0.0 27.3 19.5 13.9 13.5  6.9 11.5 5.3 3.0
NRES 27.7  27.4  29.3  5.2 14.7 0.0 0.0 25.5 1.6 15.0 14.3  6.8 10.7 15.2 16.8
AGPR 41.9  51.1  66.4  37.0 94.8 17.7 0.0 56.7 55.1 45.1 53.8  86.4 36.1 47.3 44.9
TXTL 30.7  31.5  24.9  26.6 23.2 14.4 0.0 28.1 21.9 28.2 23.9  29.1 27.6 27.7 30.2
PETR 28.2  16.5  17.5  21.1  21.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.5 14.7 29.4 15.0 11.9 16.6
OMNF 30.4  29.6  29.9  26.4  22.4 12.2 0.0 28.7 29.7 24.0 29.7  30.2 28.9 30.4 33.5
CNSTRN 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MRGNS 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OSRVS 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: GTAP database version 6.0   38
Appendix Table A5: Bilateral import tariffs of Sri Lanka, 2001  
Sector  ANZ CHN JPN REA ASEAN BGD IND LKA RSA NAFTA RAMR EU27 REUR MENA SSA
CRLS 0.3  5.0  0.0  0.0 5.0 0.0 11.4 0.0 31.8 0.0 3.4  0.0 0.0 9.2 2.5
OCRPS 13.4  19.5  3.2  2.1  53.6 4.5 24.3 0.0 27.5 44.7 64.2  29.4 13.8 13.5 24.6
ANML 10.5  5.5  6.5  9.4  11.3 0.0 12.8 0.0 8.1 13.3 0.0  3.2 0.7 4.6 10.2
NRES 0.0  3.2  5.0  6.7 0.6 0.0 5.9 0.0 1.1 6.4 6.6  1.1 5.5 0.1 6.1
AGPR 11.4  25.2  15.5  8.5 19.2 0.0 19.7 0.0 12.5 30.0 5.6  18.3 16.6 15.9 59.4
TXTL 0.8  0.9  1.4  1.5 1.6 3.1 1.8 0.0 4.0 2.2 1.0  1.0 0.4 4.1 0.5
PETR 8.5  9.0  10.1  11.8  6.9 0.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 8.9 2.3  10.1 7.5 15.4 14.9
OMNF 5.0  8.5  7.4  8.8  7.6 7.0 6.2 0.0 6.0 5.2 4.2  5.6 4.1 5.3 7.2
CNSTRN 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MRGNS 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OSRVS 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: GTAP database version 6.0 
 
Appendix Table A6: Bilateral import tariffs of Rest of South Asia, 2001  
Sector  ANZ CHN JPN REA ASEAN BGD IND LKA RSA NAFTA RAMR EU27 REUR MENA SSA
CRLS 5.4  0.0  4.9  0.0 5.0 0.0 12.4 14.2 0.6 23.5 0.2  18.1 24.3 9.4 3.8
OCRPS 6.8  13.2  10.5  9.7 17.8 11.9 14.0 16.9 21.7 6.9 8.9  9.8 6.3 9.8 23.2
ANML 1.6  5.6  7.9  4.7  9.8 2.8 9.8 10.3 4.2 7.8 4.2  6.2 3.7 6.4 5.5
NRES 7.3  6.0  15.0  3.8  10.5 0.0 6.2 11.7 15.9 9.8 0.6  8.8 7.9 16.1 11.0
AGPR 14.7  16.7  16.5  25.3 52.7 36.0 26.7 15.8 11.0 31.4 31.6  25.7 19.9 21.9 24.5
TXTL 11.1  15.3  14.7  21.8 17.2 25.6 14.3 21.0 15.9 16.1 9.4  18.6 13.2 22.3 12.8
PETR 18.9  10.1  18.8  16.6  16.6 0.0 19.9 17.6 0.0 19.1 7.9  17.6 15.7 12.6 16.1
OMNF 14.8  16.9  30.3  18.9  15.3 17.5 20.7 16.7 16.4 12.5 16.2  16.5 14.0 14.2 18.7
CNSTRN 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MRGNS 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OSRVS 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: GTAP database version 6.0   39
Appendix Table A7: Intra-regional imports at c.i.f. prices (US$ millions)  
  Base values  SAFTA Scenario values 
Importing country  Exporting country  Exporting country 
Bangladesh  India Sri  Lanka RSA India Sri  Lanka RSA 
Cereals 106.1  0.0  0.0  126.2  0.0  0.0 
Other crops  128.7  0.8  15.2 249.7  3.0  14.0 
Animal  products  10.2 1.0  0.4  18.4 1.2  0.3 
Natural  resources  26.3 0.0  3.1  68.5 0.0  8.4 
Agro-processing 118.6  2.4  34.2 233.1  7.1  43.7 
Textiles  249.8  1.4 93.7 599.4  7.2 484.9 
Petroleum  products  34.8 0.0  0.1  98.1 0.0  0.2 
Other  manufactures  572.0  8.7 25.4 1452.0  37.6 69.5 
Construction 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Margin activities  1.1  0.3  1.7  1.1  0.3  1.6 
Other services  2.5  0.6  1.1  2.5  0.6  1.0 
Total  1250.0 15.2  174.8 2849.0 56.8  623.6 
India  Bangladesh Sri Lanka RSA Bangladesh Sri Lanka RSA 
Cereals 0.2  0.0  0.1  3.5  0.0  0.1 
Other  crops  20.2  22.1 89.7 43.8  48.7 343.0 
Animal products  5.9  0.6  2.5  6.3  1.3  4.3 
Natural resources  0.0  0.7  30.5 0.0  7.2  30.5 
Agro-processing 1.1  0.7  138.0 2.2  5.4  968.1 
Textiles 5.2  2.4  62.6 14.5  13.1  216.7 
Petroleum products  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.0  0.3  0.4 
Other manufactures  26.0  39.1  274.7 61.6  300.2  2024.0 
Construction 0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.3 
Margin activities  2.2  6.6  18.9 2.2  6.3  17.3 
Other services  3.6  6.5  13.8 3.6  6.2  12.7 
Total 64.3  79.0  631.4 137.8  388.6  3618.0 
Sri Lanka  Bangladesh India RSA Bangladesh India  RSA 
Cereals  0.0  9.1 0.0  0.0  17.1 0.1 
Other  crops  0.3  68.7 18.4 0.2  134.8 35.8 
Animal products  0.0  0.7  0.5  0.0  1.1  0.7 
Natural resources  0.0  2.7  0.6  0.0  5.7  0.6 
Agro-processing  0.0  47.3 37.2 0.0  104.5 53.4 
Textiles  2.3 145.0  64.5 3.0 157.4  70.6 
Petroleum products  0.0  7.6  0.2  0.0  9.7  0.2 
Other  manufactures  2.0 362.8  20.2 3.3 545.4  31.1 
Construction 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Margin activities  0.1  3.8  1.3  0.1  3.8  1.2 
Other services  0.3  6.1  0.5  0.3  6.1  0.5 
Total  4.9 653.8  143.5 6.9 985.5  194.2 
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Appendix Table A7: Intra-regional imports at c.i.f. prices (US$ millions)  
  Base values  SAFTA Scenario values 
Importing country  Exporting country  Exporting country 
Rest of South Asia (RSA) Bangladesh India Sri Lanka RSA Bangladesh India  Sri Lanka RSA
Cereals  0.0  0.5 0.0 8.6  0.0  1.1  0.1 8.4 
Other crops  44.2  38.3 33.4  27.0 79.9  74.0  71.6  24.2
Animal  products  0.0  0.9 0.9 1.6  0.0  1.3  1.4 1.5 
Natural  resources  0.0 45.3 0.2 7.6  0.0  98.4 0.3 6.1 
Agro-processing 0.3  128.3 8.5  107.1 1.2  401.9  16.5  90.8
Textiles 1.3  23.8 56.4  4.3  6.8  57.2  196.2  3.3 
Petroleum  products  0.0  5.3 0.5 0.1  0.0  11.3 1.0 0.1 
Other manufactures  4.1  346.4 17.4  40.5 13.7  1352.8  77.4  34.6
Construction  0.0  0.3 0.0 0.1  0.0  0.3  0.0 0.1 
Margin  activities  0.9 15.4 2.0 2.6  1.0  15.9 2.0 2.5 
Other  services  2.5 11.8 0.6 2.9  2.7  12.3 0.6 2.7 
Total  53.3  616.3 120.0 202.2 105.3  2026.4 367.0 174.1
 